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Abstract
People frequently engage in dishonest behavior at a cost to others, and it is therefore
beneficial to study interventions promoting honest behavior. We implemented a novel
intervention that gave participants a choice to promise to be truthful or not to promise.
To measure cheating behavior, we developed a novel variant of the mind game—the
dice-box game—as well as a child-friendly sender-receiver game. Across three studies
with adolescents aged 10 to 14 years (N = 640) from schools in India, we found that
promises systematically lowered cheating rates compared to no-promise control
conditions. Adolescents who sent truthful messages in the sender-receiver game cheated
less in the dice-box game and promises reduced cheating in both tasks (Study 1).
Promises in the dice-box game remained effective when negative externalities (Study 2)
or incentives for competition (Study 3) were added. A joint analysis of data from all
three studies revealed demographic variables that influenced cheating. Our findings
confirm that promises have a strong, binding effect on behavior and can be an effective
intervention to reduce cheating.
Keywords: honesty, cheating, behavioral ethics, moral decision making
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Keeping them honest: Promises reduce cheating in adolescents
People engage in dishonest behavior such as filing taxes incorrectly (Slemrod,
2007) or cheating on academic assignments (McCabe, Trevino, & Butterfield, 2001).
Studying cheating in real world settings is difficult when using self-reports, as it is
unclear whether cheaters can be trusted to report truthfully on their cheating behavior.
A number of tasks have therefore been devised to obtain objective measures of
dishonesty: for example, deviation of self-reported, incentivized coin flips or dice rolls
from statistically expected outcomes (Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Houser, Vetter,
& Winter, 2012; Rosenbaum, Billinger, & Stieglitz, 2014). These measures have been
validated by demonstrating their correlation with real-world cheating behaviors as
diverse as absenteeism from work, fare-dodging, misbehavior at school, or failure to
return overpaid money (Cohn & Maréchal, 2018; Dai, Galeotti, & Villeval, 2018; Hanna
& Wang, 2017; Potters & Stoop, 2016).
Developmental studies suggest that children first begin to show dishonest
behavior during the preschool years (Lee, 2013; Lewis, Stanger, & Sullivan, 1989; Polak
& Harris, 1999). It increases during middle and late childhood, and then decreases
during adolescence (Evans & Lee, 2011; Glätzle-Rützler & Lergetporer, 2015; Maggian
& Villeval, 2016). This produces an inverted U-shaped developmental curve, with
adults being at least partly dishonest (Abeler, Nosenzo, & Raymond, 2016; Gerlach,
Teoderescu, & Hertwig, 2019; Gneezy, 2005; Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008). While
self-serving dishonesty generally decreases from late childhood to adolescence, more
sophisticated forms of dishonesty (such as white lies to benefit others) have been shown
to increase during this period (Fu, Evans, Wang, & Lee, 2008; Talwar, Murphy, & Lee,
2007; Xu, Bao, Fu, Talwar, & Lee, 2010).
Given the costs of dishonesty, there is a societal interest in factors that promote
more honest behavior. Particular attention has been paid to promises as as a means to
reducing dishonest behavior in children and adults (Evans & Lee, 2010; Heyman, Fu,
Lin, Qian, & Lee, 2015; Kataria & Winter, 2013; Lyon & Dorado, 2008; Lyon, Malloy,
Quas, & Talwar, 2008; Quas, Stolzenberg, & Lyon, 2018; Talwar, Lee, Bala, & Lindsay,
PROMISES REDUCE CHEATING 2
2002, 2004). Promises are defined as voluntary commitments to perform a specific act
in the future (Austin, 1975; Searle, 1969). There is an ongoing debate on why there
exists an obligation to perform a promised act (Habib, 2018). Some philosophers have
argued that promises are binding because of a social contract that everyone benefits
from and thus everyone has an obligation to uphold (Rawls, 1955). Other theorists have
suggested that promises are binding because others expect and trust that one will
perform the promised action and violating others’ trust causes harm (Scanlon, 1990).
More recently, philosophers have suggested a hybrid account according to which trust in
promises arises due to social conventions and, again, breaking one’s promise violates the
established trust (Kolodny & Wallace, 2003). These theoretical debates are mirrored by
different stances in the behavioral sciences with some researchers suggesting that
promises are binding because of a preference for keeping one’s word (Ellingsen &
Johannesson, 2004; Vanberg, 2008), because of an aversion to disappointing other’s
expectations (Charness & Dufwenberg, 2006), or because of a combination of both
(conditional-expectation account: Mischkowski, Stone, & Stremitzer, 2019; Ederer &
Stremitzer, 2017).
Irrespective of the different stances, research has consistently found that many
people will keep their word—even at a cost to themselves (Woike & Kanngiesser,
2019)—and that promises can promote desirable behaviors in children and adults such
as cooperation, helping, recycling, or visits to doctors (Bicchieri, 2002; Charness &
Dufwenberg, 2006; Ellingsen & Johannesson, 2004; Kanngiesser, Köymen, & Tomasello,
2017; Kulik & Carlino, 1987; Ostrom, Walker, & Gardner, 1992; Wang & Katzev, 1990).
Promises to tell the truth become effective in children from five to six years of age. For
example, Heyman et al. (2015) used a peeking game with a hidden camera and found
that from five years of age Chinese children cheated less when they had promised not to
peek. Similarly, six- to seven-year-old North American children who had promised to
tell the truth revealed more often that they had played with a forbidden toy (Lyon &
Dorado, 2008). Promises to tell the truth increase their effectiveness between four to
nine years of age for North American children (Quas et al., 2018) and, generally, remain
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effective in adolescence (Evans, O’Connor, & Lee, 2018) and adulthood (Kataria &
Winter, 2013).
Many of these previous studies have forced participants to promise without an
opportunity to opt out of the commitment (Evans & Lee, 2010; Heyman et al., 2015;
Kataria & Winter, 2013; Lyon & Dorado, 2008; Lyon et al., 2008; Quas et al., 2018;
Talwar et al., 2002, 2004). Yet, promises are per definition voluntary commitments
(Searle, 1969). This point is articulated clearly by Rawls (1999, p. 303) when describing
the practice of promising:
"[...] in order to make a binding promise, one must be fully conscious, in
a rational frame of mind, and know the meaning of the operative words,
their use in making promises, and so on. Furthermore, these words must be
spoken freely or voluntarily, when one is not subject to threat or coercion,
and in situations where one has reasonably fair bargaining position, so to
speak. A person is not required to perform if the operative words are
uttered while he is asleep, or suffering delusions, or if he was forced to
promise, or if pertinent information was deceitfully withheld from him."
Forcing people to promise, therefore, relieves them of their obligation to perform
the promised act. Moreover, on ethical grounds, it can be considered a violation of
people’s autonomy and deliberate decision making (Hertwig & Grüne-Yanoff, 2017).
Some studies have investigated the effects of promises in free-form communication,
in which one could reasonably expect an absence of coercion (e.g., Charness &
Dufwenberg, 2006; Vanberg, 2008; Servátka, Tucker, & Vadovič, 2011). However, these
studies have regularly coded both statements of intent (“I will do X”) and promises (“I
promise to do X”) as commitments. Yet, statements of intent and promises are different
types of speech acts. It is perfectly plausible to utter a sentence such as “I will come to
your party, but I cannot promise.”, which only states an intention to do something and
explicitly hedges against circumstances that may hinder the fulfilment of this intention
(e.g., other obligations, change of mood, etc.). This illustrates that statements of intent
cannot be considered unambiguous and firm expressions of commitment.
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In the current study, participants had a choice to promise to be truthful or to opt
out of the promise. First, to measure cheating, we implemented a novel variant of the
mind game (Jiang, 2013; Kajackaite & Gneezy, 2017; Potters & Stoop, 2016; Rahwan,
Hauser, Kochanowska, & Fasolo, 2018; Shalvi & Dreu, 2014): participants received a
box with 16 dice in a 4x4 grid (see Fig. 1). They were instructed to privately pick one
of the 16 locations, to shake the box, and to write down the number of eyes on the
chosen die. This set-up gives participants the opportunity to secretly switch to locations
with more favorable outcomes. As such switches are unobservable, the task does not
require privacy booths (Bucciol & Piovesan, 2011; Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013),
deception or hidden cameras (Evans & Lee, 2010; Heyman et al., 2015; Markiewicz &
Gawryluk, 2019; Talwar et al., 2002). Participants played the game repeatedly across 15
rounds and received prizes based on the total number of eyes on the 15 reported dice
(one die per round). Given the known probability distribution of die roll outcomes, this
allowed us to estimate dishonesty on the group level and with some precision even on
the individual level.
To implement the promise intervention, participants had a choice at the start of
the dice-box task between (a) receiving 1 point per eye conditional on making a promise
to tell the truth about the number of eyes on their chosen die or (b) receiving 0.5 points
per eye without any conditions. The promise option thus always resulted in higher
pay-offs compared to the no-commitment option. We chose these incentives so that even
potentially dishonest participants had a reason to choose the promise option. While we
incentivized participants to choose the promise option, we did not force them to
promise as it was ultimately the participants’ decision to opt for the higher pay-off and
promise (or not). Moreover, we explicitly used the word “promise” to invoke a
commitment and left no ambiguity about the nature of the commitment. We also
included a control condition (between subjects), in which participants had a choice
between payments of 0.5 points and 1 point per eye without requiring or mentioning a
promise for either choice option. We included a choice between the same pay-offs as in
the promise condition to control for possible effects this choice may have had on
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participants’ honesty. Comparing reported outcomes in the promise condition and the
control condition allowed us to estimate the effectiveness of the promise intervention. A
similar design was recently implemented in a different task with US participants (Woike
& Kanngiesser, 2019). Instructions in the control condition made no reference to truth
telling and, arguably, did not make it explicit that cheating would be an option
(Kajackaite & Gneezy, 2017). If anything, this difference in instructions should make it
harder to show an effect of promises. Nevertheless, we expected that participants in the
control condition would be aware of the possibility to cheat and make use of it - similar
to previous cheating studies that did not explicitly mention the option to cheat (Jiang,
2013; Potters & Stoop, 2016).
To measure the effectiveness of the promise intervention, we conducted three
studies with adolescents (N = 640) in schools in India. The Indian context is unique
regarding the severity of cheating in academic settings and the creativity of preventive
countermeasures (BBC World News, 2015; The Guardian, 2016, 2018). Furthermore, in
India, academic cheating has its parallels on the societal level: for example, only a small
fraction of the population reportedly pays income tax (The Times of India, 2016). A
recent worldwide study with university students (excluding India) showed that higher
societal levels of tax evasion and corruption correlated with increased cheating in an
experimental dice-rolling task (Gächter & Schulz, 2016). Previous work has also found
that cheating in an experimental task predicted school misconduct in Swiss students
(Cohn & Maréchal, 2018). Despite the relevance of the Indian context for studying
cheating behavior and interventions, few rigorous studies have been conducted in India
(Gerlach et al., 2019; for an exception see Hanna & Wang, 2017) and, to our knowledge,
none with adolescents. This seems particularly striking given that as of 2018 there were
about 250 million adolescents in India, which corresponds to 20.4% of the world’s
adolescents (UNICEF, 2019). By focusing on Indian adolescents in our study, we thus
contribute to reducing the W.E.I.R.D. (Western Educated Industrialized Rich
Democratic) sampling bias in the behavioral sciences and psychology (Henrich, Heine,
& Norenzayan, 2010; Nielsen, Haun, Kärtner, & Legare, 2017).
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In addition to the dice-box task, we included a child-friendly variant of a
sender-receiver game in Study 1, in which participants could send free-form messages to
other participants. This allowed us to test for correlations between two types of
dishonesty: towards the experimenter (in the dice-box task) and another participant (in
the sender-receiver task). In Study 2, we introduced a negative externality (Maggian,
2019; Meub, Proeger, Schneider, & Bizer, 2016): each point claimed by the participant
reduced the gain of another student in the same school. In Study 3, we created
inter-group competition (Charness, Masclet, & Villeval, 2014; Vriend, Jordan, &
Janssen, 2016) by randomly assigning participants to virtual groups and awarding a
special attractive prize to the group of participants with the highest overall point score.
In each study, we also asked participants to fill in an honesty self-report and collected
socio-demographic variables from their parents (e.g., parental education, faith) that we
entered in a joint analysis of the dice-box data from all three studies.
To summarize, in a series of three studies we make several contributions to the
literature: (1) we implemented child-friendly variants of the mind game and the
sender-receiver game to measure cheating behaviors, (2) we studied the relation between
different cheating measures, (3) we investigated the effectiveness of an incentivized,
non-forced promise intervention, (4) we studied this intervention outside the lab in
school settings, (5) we conducted our study in India, where a societal concern about
cheating in academic settings is prevalent, and (6) we worked with Indian adolescents
that are still largely under-represented in behavioral studies, despite comprising a fifth
of the world’s adolescents.
Study 1
Adolescents participated in the dice-box game, a child-friendly sender-receiver
game, and they completed an honesty self-report. Half of the participants were assigned
to the promise and the control condition, respectively. Participants played both games
in the same condition. We implemented the promise condition in the dice-box game as
described in the introduction. In the sender-receiver game, participants first acted as
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senders and then as receivers (within-subject design). Therefore, we included two
different game versions: a circle-game and a squares-game. Senders did not know that
they would also play a variant of the game as receivers later on. In the promise
condition of the sender-receiver game, participants had a choice between playing the
game for a total of (a) 30 points or (b) 60 points conditional on the promise to report
the rules truthfully to the receiver (control condition: the same choice without
mentioning of a promise).
Methods
Participants. All participants were recruited from English-speaking medium
schools in Pune, India. Pune is a city with 3.4 million inhabitants in the Indian state of
Maharashtra. Participants in all studies were aged 10 to 14 years. In Study 1, n = 200
adolescents (Mage = 12.6 years, SD = 0.92, 96 [48%] females) from three schools
participated in the experiments (for further details, see Supplementary Table S1). One
additional adolescent was excluded due to learning disabilities. All adolescents who had
received parental consent were invited to take part in the study1.
The sample size was predetermined. Since our study implemented novel variants
of previous paradigms, we aimed for a larger sample size than in many previous studies
on cheating in adolescents (e.g., Bucciol & Piovesan, 2011; Evans & Lee, 2010)—but see
the study by Glätzle-Rützler and Lergetporer (2015) for sample sizes similar to ours.
An additional 24 adolescents took part in piloting sessions to ensure that materials and
wordings were age-appropriate and understood by all participants (these results are not
reported). The study was approved by the ethics committee of the Faculty of Education
and Psychology at Freie Universität Berlin. Written, informed consent had been
obtained from parents before adolescents took part in the study.
Procedure.
1 It is possible that some adolescents did not take part because they were absent on the testing day or
because the sample size had already been reached
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Overview. Participants were tested in groups of four, seated well apart at
individual tables in their school (for the set-up, see SI). All adolescents in a group
participated in the same condition (balanced by gender and age for each school).
Participants played two games: 1) the dice-box game and 2) the sender-receiver game
(in fixed order). They also filled in a brief honesty self-report at the end of the study.
All testing was conducted in English by the second author.
Figure 1 . Example of a dice box used in the study - closed (left panel) and open (right
panel). Participants privately picked one of 16 locations, shook the box, and wrote
down the number of eyes on their chosen die.
Dice-box game. In the dice-box game, each participant played with a box
containing 16 dice in a 4x4 grid. To prepare the materials, we used boxes from a letter
word game and substituted the letter dice with regular dice. The boxes were taped shut
and labelled with “top” and “down” (see Fig. 1). Participants privately picked one of
the 16 locations, shook the box, and wrote down the number of eyes on their chosen die.
The experimenter handed each participant an instruction sheet that explained the
dice-box game (see SI). After participants had read the instructions, the experimenter
demonstrated the task once: she announced her chosen die location to the participants,
shook the box and asked participants to state the number of eyes on the die in this
location. Next, she collected the instruction sheets, and participants individually
answered a set of comprehension questions to test their understanding of the dice-box
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game (see SI).
Depending on the condition, participants received one of two versions of an
answer sheet on which they could indicate how many points they would like to receive
for each eye on their chosen dice throughout the game (see SI). Participants in the
promise condition had a choice between:
Option A: For each dot, you receive 1/2 point. You have to do nothing more.
Option B: For each dot, you receive 1 point. You will have to promise that
you will tell the truth about how many dots there are on your die.
Participants in the control condition instead had a choice between:
Option A: For each dot, you receive 1/2 point.
Option B: For each dot, you receive 1 point.
Participants in both conditions were also provided with an example to illustrate
how many points each option would yield (see SI). We also reminded them that all eyes
on the chosen die would be summed up after 15 rounds, that the points would be
exchanged for real prizes, and that the more points they had the more prizes they
would receive (see SI).
Once participants had chosen an option, each participant received a dice-box and
played the game for 15 rounds. All adolescents in a group shook their boxes at the same
time. For each round, their answer sheet listed the six possible die outcomes as pictures
and participants indicated the number of eyes on their chosen die by circling the
respective picture (see SI).
Sender-receiver game. In the sender-receiver game, participants played for
points that—similar to the dice game—were later converted into prizes. Participants
first played the part of senders and then—unannounced—the part of receivers. To test
participants in both roles, we used two different versions of the sender-receiver game: a
circle-game and a squares-game. Half of the senders played the circle-game and half of
them played the squares-game (balanced across conditions). Senders who had played
the circle-game played the squares game as receivers and vice-versa.
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In the circle-game, the placement of a cross by the receiver inside, outside or on
the line of a printed circle determined the outcomes for both sender and receiver (see
SI). In case the cross was placed inside the circle, the sender received all the points. In
case the cross was placed on the line of the circle, the points were equally split between
the sender and the receiver. Finally, in case the cross was placed outside the circle, the
receiver was awarded all the points.
In the squares-game, the receiver had an option to circle one, two or three printed
squares to determine the outcomes for both sender and receiver (see SI). In case one
square was circled, the sender received all the points. In case two squares were circled,
the points were equally split between the sender and the receiver. In case three squares
were circled, the receiver was awarded all the points.
In the sender role, participants first read instruction sheets explaining the general
rules of the game (called the “message game”; see SI) as well as the specific rules of the
circle-game or squares-game. The instruction sheets included visualisations to facilitate
comprehension of the game sequence and pay-offs. In addition, the experimenter
repeated the rules to the entire group of adolescents. Senders learnt that they would
play the game with another student (receiver) from the same school and that both
would remain anonymous to each other. Senders were further told that their message
was the only information about game rules available to the receiver, and that the
receiver’s choice would determine the points for both players. Senders answered a set of
comprehension questions to test their understanding of the sender-receiver game (see
SI).
Depending on condition, participants received one of two answer sheets, on which
they could choose for how many points they would like to play the game (see SI) - it
should be noted that we assigned all participants to matching conditions in the dice-box
and the sender-receiver game (promise/promise or control/control). Participants in the
promise condition faced the following choice:
Option A: Play the game with a total of 30 points. You have to do nothing
more.
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Option B: Play the game with a total of 60 points. You have to promise to
the other student that you told the truth about how to play the game and the
consequences of the decision in the game.
Participants in the control condition instead faced the following choice:
Option A: Play the game with a total of 30 points.
Option B: Play the game with a total of 60 points.
Once participants had indicated their choice, they wrote an open-form message to
the receiver on a blank piece of paper and handed it to the experimenter in a sealed
envelope.
In the receiver role, participants first received an instruction sheet that explained
their role in the game and included visualizations to facilitate comprehension (see SI).
Specifically, receivers learnt that they would play with another student (sender) from
their school and that the receivers as well as the sender would remain anonymous. They
were also told that they would receive a message from the sender explaining the rules of
the game, and that their choices would determine the points for both the sender and
the receiver. The instructions also emphasized that the rules of the game differed from
the rules of the game that they had just played as senders. They then received a sealed
envelope with the message of another participant from their school. They also received
an answer sheet that, depending on the game variant, either showed a printed circle or
three printed squares (see SI). Receivers then indicated their answers either by
positioning a cross (inside, outside or on the circle in the circle-game variant) or by
drawing a circle around a chosen number of boxes (one, two, or three in the
squares-game variant). We did not tell receivers whether senders had made a promise or
not.
Honesty self-report and socio-demographics. After completing the
sender-receiver game in both roles, participants filled in an honesty self-report by
indicating on a five-point-Likert scale how strongly they agreed with five different
statements (see Table 1, Supplementary Figure S2). When giving informed consent,
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parents provided socio-demographic information on, for example, their educational
background and faith (for details, see SI). We entered these variables in a joint analysis
of the dice-box game data from Studies 1–3.
Rewards. Participants played for points, but were unaware of the specific
rewards and the conversion rate of points to rewards. We only handed out rewards after
all eligible adolescents in a school had taken part in the study. In consultation with
schools, we rewarded participants with stationary items (e.g., pencils, erasers). We used
a conversion rate of 14 points per item, and participants received M = 8.2 items
(SD = 2.35) in Study 1.
Data coding and analyses. Data were analyzed in IBM SPSS (Version
24.0.0.0, 64bit) and ESCI (Cumming, 2016).
We report the data from dice-box game as statistical over-reporting (hence
“over-reporting”). Summed across 15 random dice rolls, the statistically expected
number of eyes is 52.5—assuming honest reporting—and the maximum possible number
is 90. We report results as the deviation of observed from expected outcome (with a
possible maximum of 90 − 52.5 = 37.5 eyes and negative values possible). While we
cannot know for certain whether someone deliberately over-reported their results or was
simply lucky; statistically, any positive deviation from 52.5 eyes is considered
over-reporting.
Two independent coders, who were blind to condition, coded the 200 messages
Table 1
Items in the honesty self-report
No. Item Polarity
1 Today, I have told the truth in all of my answers. positive
2 When talking to other students, I am honest. positive
3 When talking to teachers, I am honest. positive
4 Cheating is sometimes necessary in school. negative
5 Cheating is sometimes necessary in life. negative
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sent by participants in the sender-receiver game. A message was scored as (a) truthful if
the sender truthfully reported the rules and stated all three pay-off options or (b)
non-truthful if the sender did not truthfully report the rules and did not state all three
pay-off options. There were only two mismatches between the two coders (across 200
messages coded; κ = 0.97). These mismatches were moderated by the first author (blind
to condition), who sided once with each coder.
Data availability. The dice-box task data for all three studies and the sender
receiver game data for Study 1 can be found here [anonymous link for blind review]:
https://osf.io/hzdfe/?view_only=e1ee38281a7b40b8bab5d39778b5bf7b. Note that
socio-demographic variables were removed to protect participants’ privacy. Data with
socio-demographic information are available upon reasonable request by researchers at
academic institutions.
Results
Dice game. Two participants in the promise condition provided incorrect
answers to the comprehension questions for the dice-box task and were excluded from
the analyses. The higher payment option (one point per eye) was chosen by nearly all
participants in the control condition (n1dc = 98) and by all participants in the promise
condition (n1dp = 98). We restricted analyses to participants who chose the higher
payment rate.
Participants over-reported an average of M = 10.40 eyes (SD = 7.93) in the
control condition (see Fig. 2). This corresponds to Mr = 27.7% of the maximum
possible over-reported eyes (i.e. 37.5 eyes), which is close to the average of 21.6%
cheating found in a recent meta-analysis (Abeler et al., 2016). Participants in the
promise condition over-reported an average of M = 7.19 eyes (SD = 7.99; Mr = 19.2%),
a difference of 3.20 eyes (95% CI = [0.96, 5.45], t(194) = 2.82, p = 0.005, two-sided).
These results are confirmed by a non-parametric test (see SI).
Sender-receiver game. All participants gave correct answers to the
comprehension questions for the sender-receiver game. The higher payment option was
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Figure 2 . Distribution of over-reporting in Study 1: Dots represent individual
over-reporting scores separated by condition (jittered vertically for readability only),
the boxes show the three quartiles, and the horizontal lines include the inner 96% of the
data. The colored curves depict a smoothed data distribution for the two conditions
(y-axis corresponds to the relative frequency of scores above/below the expected
average); the blue curve shows the expected distribution assuming randomly selected
dice (with a mean of zero).
chosen by the majority of participants in both the control condition (n1sc = 84
participants) and the promise condition (n1sp = 83 participants). Messages were coded
as fully truthful (i.e., communicating all rules and payment consequences correctly) or
as non-truthful. Table 2 shows some examples of messages participants sent.
Participants in the promise condition who chose the higher payment option (i.e.,
promised to be truthful) sent fewer untruthful messages (5 out of 83, 6%,
95% CI = [3%, 13%]) than participants who chose the higher payment option in the
control condition (17 out of 84, 20.2%, 95% CI = [13%, 30%]; χ2(1) = 7.37, p = 0.007;
see Fig. 3). Conversely, participants who chose the lower rate in the promise condition
(i.e., did not promise to be truthful) sent more untruthful messages (16 out of 17, 94%,
95% CI = [73%, 99%]) than participants in the control condition (4 out of 16, 25%,
95% CI = [10%, 50%]; χ2(1) = 16.49, p < 0.001). Across both conditions, participants
who sent a truthful message had a higher score on the honesty self-report scale
(n = 158, M = 3.16, SD = 0.63) than participants who did not send a truthful message
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Figure 3 . Proportions of messages coded as untruthful split by condition
(control/promise) and by choice of payment rate. Markers indicate observed
proportions with vertical lines showing their 95% CIs.
(n = 42, M = 2.83, SD = 0.70, 95% CI(∆) = [0.11, 0.55], t(198) = 2.95, p = 0.004).
Next, we analyzed outcomes for senders in the sender-receiver game by running an
ANOVA with points received as dependent variable and main effects of payment choice
(30 vs. 60 points), promise given (yes/no), truthful message (yes/no) and the
interaction between promise given and truthful message in the model. We found
significant main effects of truth-telling (F (1, 195) = 9.84, p = 0.002, partial η2 = 0.05)
and payment rate choice (F (1, 195) = 3.91, p = 0.049, partial η2 = 0.02), but no
significant effect of promise given (F (1, 195) = 0.12, p = 0.73, partial η2 = 0.001) and
no significant interaction (F (1, 195) = 3.21, p = 0.07, partial η2 = 0.02). Both being
untruthful and choosing the higher pay-off resulted in higher outcomes for senders.
To link the dice game and the sender-receiver game, we conducted an ANOVA
with over-reported eyes as dependent variable2 and condition and truth-telling in the
sender-receiver game as factors. We found significant main effects of condition
(F (1, 192) = 6.72, p = 0.01, partial η2 = 0.03) and truth-telling (F (1, 192) = 4.82,
p = 0.03, partial η2 = 0.02), but no significant interaction (F (1, 192) = 0.21, p = 0.65,
partial η2 = 0.00). Participants in the promise condition and those who sent truthful
messages over-reported fewer eyes.
2 We excluded the four participants who chose the lower payment rate in the dice-box game or who
failed the control questions in that game.
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Table 2
Examples of messages sent by participants in the sender-receiver game in Study 1.
No. Example Code Comment
1 If one box is circled then I will get the point. If two boxes are
circled then we both will get half points. If all three boxes are
circled then you will get all points.
True —
2 If there is cross inside circle, I will get point and you nothing
will get. If there is cross on the circle, I will get half point and
you will get half point. If there is cross outside the circle, I will
not get any point, all point will be your.
True —
3 You have a circle in front of you. If there is a cross inside the
circle you get all the points and I get nothing. If there is a cross
outside the boundry of the circle I get all the points. If there
is a cross on the boundry of the circle then I get all the points.
Do what you want - choice is yours.
Untrue None of the pay-off options are
stated correctly; the pay-offs for
making a cross inside and outside
the circle, respectively, are pre-
sented in inverse.
4 If you do cross in the circle, I will get all the points. If the cross
is on the circle, I will get half point and you will get half point.
And if you do cross outside the circle, no one will get point,
you also and me also.
Untrue The sender fails to convey that a
cross outside the circle will deliver
all the points to the receiver.
5 Rules for the game: If 1 box is circled I will get all the points
and you will get nothing. If 2 boxes are circled we both will
get half of the points. If 3 boxes are circled you will get all the
points and I will get twice of your points.
Untrue Circling three squares would not
give the sender twice as many
points as the receiver.
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Study 2
Study 2 investigated the link between cheating behavior and the consequences of
this behavior, in particular, negative consequences for others. Past research has
revealed contradictory findings regarding the impact of negative externalities on
cheating behaviour, with some studies finding reductions in bribery and cheating (Barr
& Serra, 2009; Meub et al., 2016; Senci, Hasrun, Moro, & Freidin, 2019) and others
finding no reduction (Abbink, Irlenbusch, & Renner, 2002; Maggian, 2019). For
example, Meub et al. (2016) reported lower levels of cheating when it harmed another
participant (though effects were non-significant). In contrast, Maggian (2019) found no
difference in cheating rates when it reduced the budget of the experimenter as compared
to donations to a charity. In Study 1, cheating in the dice-box task only harmed the
experimenter(s), while cheating in the sender-receiver game resulted in potential harm
to another student. Our results indicated that behaviours in these two games were
related, but this does not allow us to draw any direct conclusions about the role of
negative externalities as the two tasks varied on a range of factors. We therefore
introduced a negative externality into the dice-box task by announcing that we would
subtract each point claimed by the participant from the fixed endowment of another
student in the same school. Over-reporting thus resulted both in gains for the
participant and losses for another student. If participants are reluctant to inflict costs
on peers, we will find that cheating rates are generally reduced. In addition,
participants who are sensitive to such moral cues may report honestly irrespective of
the promise intervention, rendering it ineffective. Adolescents participated in the
dice-box game and completed an honesty self-report. Half of the participants were
assigned to the promise and half to the control condition, respectively.
Methods
Participants. All participants were again recruited from English medium
schools in Pune, India. In this study, n = 200 adolescents aged 10 to 14 years
(Mage = 12.5 years, SD = 0.88, 103 [52%] females) from five schools participated (for
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further details see Supplementary Table S1). One additional group of four participants
was excluded due to outside interference. The sample size was predetermined to be the
same as in Study 1. The study was approved by the ethics committee of the Faculty of
Education and Psychology at Freie Universität Berlin. Written, informed consent had
been obtained from parents before adolescents took part in the study.
Procedure. The set-up and procedure were similar to those in Study 1 with the
exception that participants only played the dice-box game and that we introduced a
negative externality. Specifically, participants were told that they would be paired with
another student from their school (identities remained mutually anonymous), that there
was a limited number of points in the game, and that their gains would be subtracted
from the other student’s fixed initial endowment of points (see SI). We set the total
endowment to 100 points and allocated the remaining points to other students in the
school who had participated in the game (but were not tested together with the
participant in a group of four students). Participants filled in the five-item honesty
self-report (see SI). We used the same rewards and conversion rate as in Study 1.
Participants received M = 7.1 items (SD = 1.06) in Study 2.
Results
One participant in the control condition provided incorrect answers to the
comprehension questions and was excluded from the analyses. The higher payment
option was chosen by the vast majority of participants in the control condition
(n2c = 93 participants) and in the promise condition (n2p = 99 participants). We
restricted analyses to participants who chose the higher payment rate. Participants
over-reported an average of M = 10.53 eyes (SD = 8.68; Mr = 28.1%) in the control
condition and an average of M = 8.00 eyes (SD = 8.52; Mr = 21.3%) in the promise
condition (see Fig. 4), a difference of 2.54 eyes (95% CI = [0.09, 4.99], t(190) = 2.04,
p = 0.042). This result is confirmed by a non-parametric test (see SI).
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Figure 4 . Distribution of over-reporting in Study 2 split by condition (see Fig. 1 for
details).
Study 3
Competition describes a situation of scarcity, in which achieving one’s goal
excludes others from achieving their goal (Deutsch, 1949). Social comparisons of one’s
own achievement with that of others can lead to increased competition (Garcia, Tor, &
Schiff, 2013). Past research has shown that envy for other’s achievements can lead to
deception in negotiations (Moran & Schweitzer, 2008) and that situational factors like
ranking systems can increase unethical behaviors (Vriend et al., 2016), lead to
destructive competition (Hafenbrädl & Woike, 2018), sabotage of the work of others
(Charness et al., 2014) and lower rates of cooperation (Woike & Hafenbrädl, 2020). In
academic contexts, a meta-analysis identified a positive relationship between perceived
competition for grades and cheating in college students (Whitley, 1998). Given this, we
wanted to test whether participants would cheat more in our task with competition,
and, if this were the case, whether our promise intervention would remain effective. We
created inter-group competition by randomly assigning participants to groups and
awarding a special, attractive prize (gel pens and notebooks) to the group with the
highest overall score. Adolescents participated in the dice-box game and completed an
honesty self-report. We compared the special-prize group with a no-special-prize group,
and assigned half of the participants per group to the promise condition and half to the
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control condition, respectively (2x2 between-subject design).
Methods
Participants. All participants were recruited from English medium schools in
Pune, India. In this study, n = 240 adolescents (Mage = 11.8 years, SD = 0.91, 120
[50%] females) from three schools participated (see Supplementary Table S1 for further
details). The sample size was predetermined: we decided on a larger sample size than in
Studies 1 and 2 due to the more complex design of this study. The study was approved
by the ethics committee of the Faculty of Education and Psychology at Freie
Universität Berlin.. Written, informed consent had been obtained from parents before
adolescents took part in the study.
Procedure. The set-up and procedure were similar to those in Study 1 with the
exception that participants only played the dice-box game and that we introduced a
special prize. Specifically, half of the participants in each condition were assigned to the
special-prize condition (see SI): They were randomly assigned to virtual groups of four
students in their school (excluding those from the same test session) and told that the
group with the highest number of points in their school would win a special prize (i.e.,
gel pens and notebooks—established to be highly desired items). Participants in the
no-special-prize condition received the same instructions as in Study 1. Overall, this
resulted in a 2x2 between-subject design with 60 participants per cell of the design.
Special prizes were awarded in addition to the individually won prizes. Participants
again filled in a five-item honesty self-report (see SI). We used the same rewards and
conversion rate as in Study 1 for individual prizes. Participants received M = 4.7 items
(SD = 0.79) in Study 3.
Results
All participants gave correct answers to the comprehension questions. The higher
payment option was chosen by all participants in the control conditions (no-prize:
n3npc = 60; prize: n3pc = 60) and by almost all participants in the promise conditions
(no-prize: n3npp = 59; prize: n3pp = 59). A two-factorial ANOVA with over-reporting as
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Figure 5 . Comparison of over-reporting split by prize group (prize/no prize) with
different colors for each condition (promise/control). Dots show individual
over-reporting scores, curves show smoothed data distributions and large dots
connected by lines show the means for each of the four conditions.
dependent variable and group (prize/no-prize) and condition (promise/control) as
factors showed a significant main effect of condition (F (1, 234) = 13.26, p < .001, partial
η2 = 0.05), but a non-significant main effect of prize (F (1, 234) = 0.27, p = .60, partial
η2 = 0.001) and no significant two-way interaction of prize and condition
(F (1, 234) = 0.03, p = 0.86, partial η2 = 0.00). Fig. 5 demonstrates that the average
over-reporting was, in fact, (non-significantly) smaller when a special prize was offered
than when it was not offered. Collapsing across the prize groups, participants in the
control condition over-reported an average of M = 16.03 eyes (SD = 11.57;
Mr = 42.7%), participants in the promise condition an average of M = 11.09 eyes
(SD = 9.12; Mr = 29.6%), a difference of 4.94 eyes (95% CI = [2.28, 7.60],
t(236) = 3.66, p < .001; see Fig. 6). This result is confirmed by a non-parametric test
(see SI).
Combined analyses across Studies 1–3
We analysed the combined dice-box data from Studies 1–3 to test whether
over-reporting was predicted by socio-demographic variables and by participants’
honesty self-reports.
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Figure 6 . Distribution of over-reporting in Study 3 split by condition (see Fig. 1 for
details).
Analysis
For our analysis, we simplified the socio-demographics data (see SI): (i) we
created a binary variable for siblings (yes/no; 70% at least 1 sibling), (ii) we did not
include school performance as we realized that many parents were unable to give a
meaningful answer to this question (e.g., students are usually not ranked in their
classes), (iii) we included only the three most frequently mentioned types of faith
(Hinduism: 87% of the sample; Jainism: 5.6%; Buddhism: 1.7%) and collapsed all other
answers (including no-answers) into a fourth category (5.6% of the sample), and (iv) we
created a binary variable for parental education (university degree: yes/no; 72% of
mothers and 68% of fathers had university degrees, respectively; missing values were
replaced with the average across participants with degree information).
In all three studies, we asked participants to indicate on a five-point Likert scale
how strongly they agreed with five statements about (dis)honest behavior (see Table 1).
Each item was scored 0–4 with inverse scoring for negative items. The mean scale score
(sum of items divided by the number of items) was 3.20 (SD = 0.60).
We used the dice-box data from all three studies and included only participants
who had chosen the higher payment, passed the comprehension checks of the dice-box
game and completed all items of the honesty scale, nmeta = 622.
PROMISES REDUCE CHEATING 23
We conducted an ANCOVA with (statistical) over-reporting as dependent
variable and the following factors and covariates: condition (promise/control), prize
(special prize/no special prize), negative externality (yes/no), age in years (rounded to
the first decimal), gender, siblings (yes/no), father’s degree (university degree/no
university degree), mother’s degree (university degree/no university degree), school,
faith, and self-reported honesty. As in Studies 1–3, over-reporting was defined as the
deviation of observed from expected outcomes across 15 rounds for each participant.
Results
Fig. 7 demonstrates that there was a stable effect of promises on reducing
over-reporting across all three studies. The ANCOVA revealed that promises, school,
age, faith and maternal education had the strongest effects on over-reporting (see Table
3). Specifically, promises, age, and maternal degree were related to decreases in
over-reporting. The seven schools varied in their average over-reporting. The effect of
faith is driven by a (relatively small) group of participants with Buddhist faith who
over-reported less. The honesty scale was negatively related to over-reporting, but not
significantly so. Additional analyses, including Promise×NegativeExternality and
Promise×Prize interactions revealed the same significant main effects (see SI).
In addition, Fig. 8 shows that reported dice outcome distributions did not vary
substantially across the fifteen rounds.
General Discussion
Across three studies, we found that a novel intervention, that gave participants a
choice to promise to be truthful, reduced cheating behavior in Indian adolescents aged
10 to 14 years. The promise intervention was effective across two different tasks—a
novel variant of a mind game (the dice-box game) and a child-friendly version of the
sender-receiver game (Study 1). Moreover, the effect of promises remained stable when
we introduced a negative externality (Study 2) or incentivized inter-group competition
(Study 3). Overall, this confirms that promises have a strong, binding effect on
behavior and extends previous findings with MTurk workers that kept their promise at
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Figure 7 . Differences in over-reporting between control and promise conditions across
studies: Points show means for each condition with 95% CIs, squares show means across
studies, the diamond reports mean and 95% CI for the difference shown on a floating
axis (based on Cumming, 2016).
Figure 8 . Distribution of individual dice results across studies split by round number
and condition. The areas of squares are proportional to relative frequencies. Average
scores across rounds are summarized in the bottom row.
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Table 3
ANCOVA results for over-reporting scores across all three studies (nmeta = 622)
Source B Mean Sq. df F p part. η2
Intercept 24.06 1166.19 1 14.29 <0.001 0.02
Promise Condition (0 = no, 1 = yes) -3.49 1845.71 1 22.61 <0.001 0.04
Prize (0 = no, 1 = yes) -0.41 10.23 1 0.13 0.723 0.00
Negative Externality (0 = no, 1 = yes) 0.45 15.22 1 0.19 0.666 0.00
Age in years -0.87 331.68 1 4.06 0.044 0.01
Gender (0 = male, 1 = female) -0.14 2.92 1 0.04 0.850 0.00
Siblings (0 = no, 1 = yes) -0.61 43.44 1 0.53 0.466 0.00
Degree father (0 = no, 1 = yes) 0.24 4.59 1 0.06 0.813 0.00
Degree mother (0 = no, 1 = yes) -2.91 437.81 1 5.36 0.021 0.01
School ma 372.45 6 4.56 <0.001 0.04
Faith ma 246.03 3 3.01 0.030 0.02
Honesty Scale -0.49 48.40 1 0.59 0.442 0.00
Error 81.63 603
Note.aMultiple coefficients, individual coefficients not reported.
a cost to themselves (Woike & Kanngiesser, 2019). Promises can thus be a powerful
intervention to promote desirable behaviors (Bicchieri, 2002; Kulik & Carlino, 1987;
Ostrom et al., 1992; Wang & Katzev, 1990) and to curb dishonesty.
Previous studies have investigated honesty-enhancing interventions such as
reminders of university honor codes (Mazar et al., 2008) or reminders not to cheat
(Bucciol & Piovesan, 2011), appeals to honesty (Talwar, Arruda, & Yachison, 2015),
forced honesty oaths (Jacquemet, Joule, Luchini, & Shogren, 2013; Jacquemet, Luchini,
Rosaz, & Shogren, 2018; Shu, Mazar, Gino, & Bazermann, 2012) or forced promises
(Heyman et al., 2015; Kataria & Winter, 2013). Across three internal replications, we
demonstrated the effectiveness of a new promise intervention that, in contrast to
previously studied interventions, has the advantage of giving participants an option to
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refrain from making a promise. It thereby respects individual autonomy and conscious
decision making (Hertwig & Grüne-Yanoff, 2017). Moreover, our intervention clearly
and unambiguously marks the commitment as a promise and is transparent about the
nature of the commitment.
Our promise intervention featured a choice between a lower pay-off and a higher
pay-off under the condition that adolescents promised to tell the truth. The control
condition implemented a similar choice, but without the promise. We included this
incentive to counter self-selection of potentially honest participants in the promise
condition who may want to signal their honesty via promises (Ismayilov & Potters,
2016; van den Assem, van Dolder, & Thaler, 2012). In addition, the higher payment
option created an incentive for potentially dishonest participants to choose this option
and cheat. The vast majority of participants chose this higher payment option in all
conditions, indicating that theses incentives worked as intended. It is possible that the
promise to answer honestly and the fact that participants were paid more (to be honest)
worked in conjunction to create the observed reduction in cheating in the promise
condition. However, teasing apart the contribution of these two factors would prove
difficult. Giving people simply a choice between a promise to be honest or no promise
without any incentives would create the above mentioned self-selection of participants.
Removing the choice altogether would force people to promise and undermine the
deliberately voluntary nature of our intervention. One possibility for future studies
could be to focus on the control condition and compare a condition with and without a
choice. This could provide some insight into whether the choice situation by itself
(irrespective of a promise) has an impact on cheating behavior.
Cheating rates have been found to vary across different experimental paradigms
(Gerlach et al., 2019), but different paradigms are rarely presented within-subjects. We
established in Study 1 that truth-telling in a sender-receiver game predicted lower rates
of over-reporting in the dice-box task and that responses on the honesty scale predicted
behavior in the sender-receiver game. However, our combined analyses across all three
studies did not reveal an effect of responses on the honesty scale on over-reporting in
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the dice-box task. It is possible that our self-report scale only predicted cheating
behavior in the sender-receiver game because both measures are, in contrast to the
dice-box task, language-based measures and to some extent directly observable.
Additionally, the self-report scale we developed for this study may have been narrower
in scope than other measures. For example, recent analyses have shown that the
honesty-humility personality factor from the HEXACO scale strongly predicted
dishonest behavior in experimental tasks for adults (Heck, Thielmann, Moshagen, &
Hilbig, 2018). Further systematic, large-scale studies are needed to investigate the
relation between behavioral and self-reported honesty measures in adolescents.
Our combined analysis of data from all three studies showed that over-reporting
in the dice-box task decreased with age. These results are in line with previous findings
for this age group which found a decrease in cheating rates from late childhood
throughout adolescence (Evans & Lee, 2011; Glätzle-Rützler & Lergetporer, 2015;
Maggian & Villeval, 2016). One previous study did not observe age effects in 5- to
15-year-olds, possibly because the study included a relatively small sample over a wide
age range (Bucciol & Piovesan, 2011). Moreover, we found that adolescents in the
control condition in Study 1 over-reported 27.7% of the maximum possible number of
eyes, which is only somewhat higher than the average cheating rates found for adults in
a recent meta-analysis (Abeler et al., 2016).
Our combined analysis further revealed that adolescent’s gender had no significant
effect on their over-reporting. To date, evidence for gender differences in adolescents’
cheating behavior is mixed, with some studies finding no effects (Evans & Lee, 2011;
Glätzle-Rützler & Lergetporer, 2015; Maggian & Villeval, 2016) and other studies
showing significant gender differences (Cohn & Maréchal, 2018; Markiewicz &
Gawryluk, 2019). We found that adolescents whose mothers had a university degree
over-reported fewer points. There was no effect of paternal education—possibly, because
mothers are often the primary caregivers. Maternal education may have positively
influenced adolescents’ own academic performance, and higher academic achievement
has been linked to reductions in cheating behavior (Ruffle & Tobol, 2017). Faith also
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influenced over-reporting, though this effect was mainly due to reduced over-reporting
by a small group of participants of Buddhist faith and we are hesitant to draw strong
conclusions from this small sub-sample. We also found that over-reporting varied
between schools, yet, to date we cannot say which aspects of the school environment
resulted in this variation. Overall, these findings open up exciting avenues for future
studies on dishonest behavior in academic settings (Cohn & Maréchal, 2018) such as the
role of school environments or adolescents’ academic performance.
Negative externalities (Study 2) and incentives for competition (Study 3) had no
significant impact on cheating rates or the effectiveness of the promise intervention.
Past research has revealed a mixed picture of the effect of negative externalities on
cheating or bribery (Barr & Serra, 2009; Meub et al., 2016; Senci et al., 2019; Abbink et
al., 2002; Maggian, 2019)—our findings are in line with recent work showing that
cheating is not affected by whether it reduces the experimenter’s budget or donations to
a charity (Maggian, 2019). Furthermore, while past research has identified a positive
relation between competition and academic cheating (Whitley, 1998) and found that
competition can increase unethical behaviors (e.g., Vriend et al., 2016; Moran &
Schweitzer, 2008), we found no effect of incentives to compete on cheating rates. While
participants knew that there was an incentive to perform better than everyone else,
they did not receive direct feedback on their own performance or their ranking within
the school (Garcia, Tor, & Gonzalez, 2006; Woike & Hafenbrädl, 2020). Future studies
could investigate the effects of rank feedback on cheating in adolescents.
Participants in our study attended English middle schools and were tested in the
main language of instruction (English) since we wanted to investigate dishonesty in
academic settings. English is one of the two official languages in India. Generally,
linguistic diversity is the norm in India and children regularly encounter more than one
language in their everyday lives. Previous research with adults has found that testing
participants in their second (non-native) language affected moral judgements and
cheating in an experimental task (Geipel, Hadjichristidis, & Surian, 2016; Bereby-Meyer
et al., 2018). For example, Bereby-Meyer et al. (2018) found that adults from Israel,
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Korea, Spain and the US cheated less in their second language as compared to their
native language. However, it is currently unclear whether findings from predominantly
monolingual settings can be applied to the Indian context. Future work could determine
whether language has an impact on levels of honesty in multilingual settings.
Our newly developed cheating paradigms offer a series of advantages over previous
paradigms: The dice-box game and the child-friendly version of the sender-receiver
game can be easily employed across a wide age range—from late childhood to old
age—to explore, for example, dishonest behavior across the life span (Mata, Josef, &
Hertwig, 2016) or its inter-generational transmission (Chowdhury, Sutter, &
Zimmermann, 2018). Furthermore, the dice-box game is very portable, easy to
implement and does not require a computer set-up or other technical equipment. It can
thus be employed both in the lab and under challenging field settings. It also gives each
participant the protection of reasonable doubt by producing no electronic or paper
trails of true results—in fact, observation is impossible. This has the advantage that
participants can play the dice-box game in full view of the experimenters or other
participants. Even in environments, where other researchers use deceptive paradigms,
the logical impossibility of observation in the dice-box task should reassure participants
that their responses cannot be fact-checked.
To conclude, we implemented two new, child-friendly variants of cheating
measures and demonstrated the effectiveness of a new promise intervention to promote
more honest behavior. Importantly, all measures employed in the current study are
deception-free. Given the ethical mandate to avoid participant deception when in any
way feasible (American Psychological Association, 2017), the measures used in our
study have a privileged claim of fulfilling ethical standards of psychological
experimentation. Our paradigms also address concerns about deceptive practices
negatively impacting participants’ trust and performance (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001,
2008), which seems particularly appropriate in studies on honesty and trustworthiness.
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